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Abstract
Nearly 25 years ago, the shared interests of psychologists and biologists in understanding the
neural basis of social behavior led to the inception of social neuroscience. In the past decade, this
field has exploded, in large part due to the infusion of studies that use fMRI. At the same time,
tensions have arisen about how to prioritize a diverse range of questions and about the authority of
neurobiological data in answering them. The field is now poised to tackle some of the most
interesting and important questions about human and animal behavior but at the same time faces
uncertainty about how to achieve focus in its research and cohesion among the scientists who
tackle it. The next 25 years offer the opportunity to alleviate some of these growing pains, as well
as the challenge of answering large questions that encompass the nature and bounds of diverse
social interactions (in humans, including interactions through the internet); how to characterize,
and treat, social dysfunction in psychiatric illness; and how to compare social cognition in humans
with that in other animals.
I. What Is Social Neuroscience?
We live in a world that is largely socially constructed, our lives are replete with social
interactions every day, and it has been suggested that an understanding of our social
behavior could answer questions about who we are, how we differ from other animals, and
what defines the nature of our conscious experience. Moreover, the importance of social
encounters is ubiquitous across all animal species. These facts together with our intense
personal interest in the behaviors and minds of other people have spawned a rich and long
history of investigation in the social sciences. Recently, these investigations incorporated
neurobiological tools, giving birth to the field of social neuroscience.
But what exactly is social neuroscience? It encompasses all levels of biological analysis
(genetic polymorphisms, neurotransmitters, circuits and systems, as well as collective
behavior in groups) and stages of processing (sensory systems, perception, judgment,
regulation, decision-making, action), a diversity often emphasized in overviews of the field
(Adolphs, 2010; Cacioppo et al., 2001). A principled definition of social neuroscience thus
begins by saying that it is the study of the neural basis of social behavior and then elaborates
from there. However, this elaboration leaves open a wide range of methods to be employed,
species to be studied, and theoretical frameworks to anchor the findings, with disagreements
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about the relative merits of all of these components. These disagreements are reflected in the
priorities of faculty searches, funding agencies, and journal publications.
The term “social neuroscience” was first coined in the early 1990s (Cacioppo and Berntson,
1992; Cacioppo et al., 2001) in reference to a fledgling movement that emphasized a broad
and multilevel approach to the study of the neural basis of social behavior (see Lieberman,
2012 and Singer, 2012 for historical overviews from both American and European
perspectives). This gestation was accompanied by a proposal that social processing in
primates was subserved by a specific brain system (Brothers, 1990), as well as by initial
neuroimaging studies of social cognition in humans using PET (Fletcher et al., 1995; Happé
et al., 1996; Morris et al., 1996), but the tools available at the time were limited. This is
likely one reason why the field at the outset emphasized animal studies, where invasive
experimental approaches were already well established. Social neuroscience underwent a
major transformation in the late 1990s with the advent of fMRI, which led to the emergence
of “social cognitive neuroscience” (Ochsner and Lieberman, 2001), a subdiscipline that has
now grown to constitute a large component of the field. The two main societies for social
neuroscience, the Society for Social Neuroscience (S4SN) and the Social and Affective
Neuroscience Society (SANS), emphasize these dual origins, respectively. However, the
field is still very much in its infancy: SANS was established in 2008, S4SN was only
established in 2010 (each has about 300 members), and a European society is just emerging
(ESAN). These societies are comparable in size to organizations such as the Society for
Neuroeconomics (which is slightly older and larger) but are far smaller than the Cognitive
Neuroscience Society (founded in 1994; membership > 2,000) or the Society for
Neuroscience (founded in 1969; membership > 40,000). The two flagship journals of social
neuroscience, Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience (“SCAN,” publisher: Oxford
Press) and Social Neuroscience (publisher: Taylor and Francis), predate the societies only
slightly (both were founded in 2006). SANS and S4SN each have about one-third
international members, including growing constituencies in South America and Asia (two
venues for S4SN’s annual meetings) and a strong student representation, reflecting a young,
vibrant, and rapidly growing community. Currently amounting to just over 3%,
extrapolation suggests that by the early 2020s, social neuroscience publications could
constitute 10% of all neuroscience publications (Figure 1A).
Many programmatic questions are currently debated in the field. How important is it to
relate social behavior to microscopic neurobiological and genetic levels? How important is it
to study animal species other than humans? How important is translational work in
comparison to basic research? To get an initial overview of how people think about some of
these questions, we asked a sample of social neuroscientists to weigh in. Their answers
illustrate the broad base that constitutes social neuroscience, the acknowledgment of intense
interdisciplinary effort, and the sense of an open landscape in the years ahead (see Figures
1B and 1C; Table 3). Although social neuroscience needs to be broad, it also needs a focus
for nucleation, otherwise it threatens simply to merge with cognitive neuroscience or splinter
into an array of otherwise unrelated projects. And of course, there is a focus: it is the word
“social” that is raising questions about how best to circumscribe this term.
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In studying the “social,” social neuroscience is about the neurobiology involved in
perceiving, thinking about, and behaving toward other people. But it also encompasses
conspecific interactions between nonhuman animals, the anthropomorphization of stimuli
that are not really social at all, and thinking about oneself. The underlying presumption is
that these are all intimately related: animals evolved neural mechanisms for interacting with
one another and with other species commonly encountered. Conspecifics, predators, and
prey thus all require particular repertoires of behavioral interactions, made possible by
particular suites of cognitive and neurobiological processes. In humans, these can be applied
very widely and flexibly, including cases of anthropomorphization and thinking about
ourselves. In addition, they extend beyond typical dyadic interactions to both the larger-
scale collective interactions of groups and the indirect and symbolic interactions of
individuals through the internet, all hot topics for future study, as we note further below. If
all these diverse forms of social behavior were to recruit overlapping processes and activate
overlapping brain regions in neuroimaging studies, we would gain confidence that they are
sufficiently cohesive to substantiate the field of social neuroscience. Indeed, this is the
strong picture that is emerging so far.
All of the features and challenges noted above also make social neuroscience an incredibly
exciting field, and one highly attractive to young scientists. There is a plethora of open
questions (Tables 2 and 3), a wide range of parent disciplines from which the field can be
approached (Figure 1B), and a strong sense of ongoing and impending progress. Whereas
previous generations of social neuroscientists were trained in different fields, we are now
coming into our first batch of constituents reared in this multidisciplinary environment;
whereas several hurdles and critiques were tackled in the recent past, the field has now
synthesized initial views of the “social brain” (Figure 2) and generated powerful new
approaches to mining and modeling data (Table 1). Next, we briefly take stock of the major
current themes, before extrapolating into the future.
II. Where Are We Now?
Social neuroscience has made major contributions in many respects. One methodological
accomplishment has been to help develop and refine fMRI methods, an advance linked in
part to prior critiques we note below. A topical contribution has been the study of individual
differences in social behavior. This topic is now often related to genotypic differences
(Green et al., 2008) and even to structural brain differences (Kanai and Rees, 2011), with
investigation of the effects of culture a hot topic (Rule et al., 2013). There have been major
extensions also to understanding psychiatric illness (Cacioppo et al., 2007), as well as the
effects of stress and immune function on mood in healthy people (Eisenberger and Cole,
2012). And there has been a recent flurry of attention to real social interactions (as opposed
to mere simulations of them), an aspect that has almost spawned its own subdiscipline and is
of interest to cognitive scientists more broadly (Schilbach et al., 2013).
A good example of one of the earliest success stories in social neuroscience began in the late
1980s and early 1990s with the discovery of the roles of the neuropeptides oxytocin (OT)
and arginine vasopressin (AVP) in social affiliative behaviors. Not only did this work result
in a string of elegant papers dissecting the neural circuits and genetic polymorphisms
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governing affiliative behavior in an animal model (voles; Insel and Young, 2001), but it was
also extended to behavioral and neuroimaging studies in humans, including extensions to
treatments of psychiatric disorders (Baumgartner et al., 2008; Insel and Young, 2001;
Kosfeld et al., 2005; McCall and Singer, 2012). Previously known to play a role in bodily
processes related to mammalian child-rearing (OT) and kidney function (AVP), it is now
well established that both OT and AVP influence a broad range of social behaviors. In
nonhuman mammals, OT has been shown to underlie social bonding behaviors, AVP has
been linked to long-term pair bonding and male aggression, and the brain regions in which
receptors for these peptides are found have been drawn into a circuit for processing social
signals that mediate these behaviors. More than that, genetic polymorphisms in the receptor
genes have been linked to species differences in social behavior, providing a story that cuts
powerfully across widely different levels of analysis (Insel and Fernald, 2004; Insel and
Young, 2001). In the past decade, researchers have begun to explore the influence of OT
(which can be delivered intranasally) and, to a lesser extent, AVP on human social behavior:
OT can increase social trust (Kosfeld et al., 2005), normal variation in the receptor
distribution for OT and AVP in the human population has been linked to measures of
altruism and empathy, and OT administration has even been proposed as one component for
treating autism (Yamasue et al., 2012). Although it has also become clear that the effect of
OT on social behavior is highly dependent on individual differences and context, the topic
remains a rich future area of study linking pharmacological, ecological, and psychiatric
approaches.
Another major achievement of social neuroscience has been the linking of social and
physical health (Eisenberger and Cole, 2012; Eisenberger, 2012). Early work identifying the
neural correlates of social pain (e.g., from exclusion or rejection by others) found a
remarkable overlap with systems involved in physical pain and linked individual differences
in physical and social pain sensitivity. Perhaps even more telling was that experiences that
increased social pain also strongly influenced physical pain, and vice versa (Eisenberger,
2012). On the flip side, social support has been shown to reduce both subjective reports and
neural responses related to physical pain, while taking Tylenol reduces not only physical
pain but also hurt feelings and neural responses to social exclusion (Dewall et al., 2010). Far
from simply justifying the shared (though often underappreciated) sense that social pain is as
real as physical pain, the establishment of this link between the two has opened up a broad
range of new studies, emphasizing the highly interactive nature of social cognition and
behavior (a topic to which we will return below).
Perhaps in part as a consequence of the inherent attraction of the questions investigated by
social neuroscience, the field has received considerable attention from the media and hence
also the general public. This has not always been a good thing. Some overpromotion of early
findings in the field resulted in a subsequent backlash against social neuroscience for its
failure to deliver on those earlier promises. Particularly acute was a recent episode
highlighting the difficulty of supporting many claims drawn from statistical analyses of
neuroimaging data (Vul et al., 2009), an issue that pertains to both cognitive neuroscience
and social psychology more broadly, but that came to a head at the intersection of these two
fields. Social neuroscience, as well as the neuroimaging and psychology fields in general,
has been considerably sensitized to these issues, with the overall result that statistical
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inferences are applied more cautiously by authors and better scrutinized by journal
reviewers, publication biases are being exposed in the literature, and increased value has
been assigned to replication (Francis, 2012; Green et al., 2008; Kriegeskorte et al., 2010;
Poldrack, 2011). However, given the complexity of the phenomena studied by social
neuroscience, these issues will continue to demand attention. Their exposure is shaping
collective efforts to control for false-positive findings and to construct large databases
against which new results can be compared and interpreted (Poldrack, 2011; Yarkoni et al.,
2011). With social neuroscience now inoculated with the above critiques, the field is ready
to tackle a number of current “hot topics” that we mention only briefly here for the sake of
space.
(A) Interactive Neuroscience
The processes that come into play during real social interactions have been dubbed the “dark
matter” of social neuroscience (Schilbach et al., 2013). Studying ecologically valid social
interactions in humans is often difficult for two simple reasons: it is ethically tricky (in many
cases requiring deception because people otherwise know they are part of an experiment),
and it relinquishes some degree of experimental control. It is also an unusually rich and
interesting topic, exactly what social psychologists would wish to study and many
neurobiologists think is too fuzzy to study. One prescription for the future might be to draw
on both of these fields and to study real social interactions—but in well-controlled animal
models. Animals usually do not know they are part of an experiment, and achieving
ecological validity has a long track record in neuroethology. On the other hand, studies in
nonhuman animals have their own problems, including lack of verbal report and explicit
instruction, making it often very difficult to know how to interpret what we observe (Figure
3).
(B) Social Neuroscience of Psychiatric Disorders
This topic should in our view be considered simply one aspect of studying individual
differences, including cultural effects. The extent to which any given social behavior is
pathological or not is often relative to a particular society and is almost always on a
spectrum. The recent push by the National Institute of Mental Health to discover more basic
dimensions along which psychiatric illnesses can be described (Kapur et al., 2012), as
opposed to the categorical classifications provided by DSM-based diagnoses, also opens up
this topic to fusion with data-driven approaches (Poldrack et al., 2012). The field is
especially exciting because, perhaps for the first time, we can begin to see a strong
alternative to the symptom-driven classification of mental disorders provided by traditional
psychiatry. Just as psychiatry has embraced approaches from molecular biology and
cognitive neuroscience, it should embrace computational tools and modeling methods. If we
want to be able to map disorders onto the brain, we need models that specify particular
cognitive processes so that we can understand which ones are explanatory and how.
Computational psychiatry, in our view, will be a major focus within social neuroscience in
the near future (Montague et al., 2012).
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(C) Social Neuroscience of Collective Behavior and the Internet
Over the past 25 years, the type and quality of our social interactions have undergone a
profound shift as online interactions (e.g., email, instant messaging, social networks) have
supplemented, and in many cases supplanted, face-to-face interactions. Indeed, one open
question is how social development will be influenced by this radical shift in how we
interact (e.g., without social cues that we have evolved to process). There are now several
intriguing studies of the relationship between neural function and social networks (e.g.,
Bickart et al., 2011, 2012; Kanai et al., 2012; Meshi et al., 2013), a topic that has been
explored also in monkeys (Sallet et al., 2011). One clear direction for the future of social
neuroscience is the development of tools and metrics for the analysis of electronically
available social data, such as online social interactions, given the ready availability of
massive amounts of such data. With the substantial efforts already put into social network
analysis more generally (e.g., from Google), one could think of social neuroscience as
capitalizing and piggybacking on this larger enterprise. The ingredient that needs to be
added, of course, is the neural data. In principle, one could imagine achieving this, at least in
part, by combining MRI data acquired across thousands of people (e.g., the database that
NeuroSynth provides) with their social network information. The trick would be tracking
individuals across these two very different sets of data, an issue that will occupy not only
database experts but also institutional review boards who protect the confidentiality of data
on human subjects!
Taking stock more broadly, what has emerged from the corpus of social neuroscience
research is not a single, but several, neural systems for processing social information.
Correspondingly, there has been a shift from focusing on the function of structures in
isolation (Figure 2A) to understanding circuits and systems, with increasing attention to
connectivity (Figures 2B and 2C). To date, a number of core networks have been identified
as having functional properties related to social processing; we briefly mention four (Figure
2B) (Kennedy and Adolphs, 2012). One, the “social perception” network, centered on the
amygdala, has been implicated in a range of social behaviors including the influence of
emotion on social decision-making, responses to socially threatening stimuli, and social
saliency in general, social-affiliative behaviors and social pain. Sometimes these somewhat
diverse functions fractionate into three networks involving different amygdala nuclei
(Bickart et al., 2012). A second, “mentalizing,” network is engaged both when actively
thinking about others and when reflecting on oneself (Mitchell et al., 2005; Saxe and Powell,
2006; Spunt and Lieberman, 2012; Van Overwalle and Baetens, 2009; Frith and Frith,
2006). Interestingly, this network shows considerable overlap with the so-called default
mode network (Raichle et al., 2001), which is more active and coupled during rest, as well
as with networks subserving episodic and prospective memory. This suggests that perhaps
all these functions share something in common, such as an ability to shift one’s perspective
away from current stimuli (Buckner and Carroll, 2007). A third network concerned with
“empathy” is engaged when individuals experience vicarious emotions from observing
others (de Vignemont and Singer, 2006). Finally, a fourth, “mirror,” network is activated
when individuals observe the actions of others and is thought to play a role in learning
through observation (Carr et al., 2003; Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004; Spunt and
Lieberman, 2012). The empathy and mirror networks are clearly related, and the mentalizing
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and mirror networks have in fact been combined into more global schemes for a unified
model of how we think about other people (Keysers and Gazzola, 2007). However, there is
certainly not unanimous agreement on precisely what the networks are, on their
composition, or on how best to study them (Barrett and Satpute, 2013).
Indeed, it is likely that current beliefs about network architecture are biased, at least in part,
by pre-existing theoretical divisions and distinctions in social psychology—as well as
limited by data. An alternative data-driven approach that is less biased capitalizes on data
mining of the literature to find relationships between the psychological concepts studied and
the brain activation patterns that emerge over several thousand publications (Table 1; Figure
2C) (Yarkoni et al., 2011). Networks derived from these data-driven approaches will need to
be compared and combined in some way with networks obtained from specific social
neuroscience studies that use concepts from social psychology, as well as with networks
obtained from model-based approaches. Yet even a cursory exploration with a data-driven
approach (using NeuroSynth, see Figure 2C) yields both a confirmation of known patterns
(e.g., several regions, such as medial prefrontal cortex and precuneus, feature in social
cognition networks) as well as the discovery of new ones that can be further tested (e.g., the
amygdala appears to participate in many social cognition processes but not mentalizing).
The future approach we advocate uses such data mining not as the sole tool but precisely to
test results against patterns in the literature and to motivate new hypotheses to be further
tested with other approaches (cf. Table 1).
One looming question regarding the concept of the “social brain” and its modern network
versions is whether any of these networks are specialized for processing social information.
Plausibly, all social cognition draws on entirely domain-general processes, only applied to
social stimuli. This unresolved question has been discussed in detail before (e.g., Adolphs,
2010) with the recommendation that, for methodological reasons, we should assume the
existence of such specialized processes and brain networks (e.g., Kennedy and Adolphs,
2012). This assumption may in time be proved wrong, or wrong for some of the networks
(e.g., Barrett and Satpute, 2013), but there are enough examples that we feel it must be at
least partly right, and we just need to delineate the boundaries of the social brain rather than
question the entire concept. For instance, there are uncontentious examples of systems
specialized for processing social information in the case of pheromone detection in insects
and in the case of the vomeronasal system in many mammals. Examples in primates are
more debated, but again we would argue that there are clear studies ranging from lesion
work to neuroimaging of face processing.
Although we have moved from regions to networks, the next key step is to identify the flow
of information through these networks to follow social information processing from stimulus
through to response. This requires an understanding of the detailed computations
implemented by the different nodes in the networks as well the dynamic interplay between
them. One could make the analogy of moving from words (brain areas) to sentences
(networks) to propositions (arrangements of network dynamics) to conversations (brains
interacting). We are still solidly in the age of sentences and are only beginning to enter the
age of propositions and conversations.
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III. Where Are We Going?
Social neuroscience must include a wide selection of methods, study a wide range of
species, and utilize a range of concepts and theories. It is this topical and methodological
breadth, combined with its interdisciplinary approach, that generates tension in the field.
Psychologists often find the methods of neuroscience impressive but its concepts and
theories impoverished. Neurobiologists find the questions of social psychology intriguing
but its methods limited. No wonder there is often little agreement at faculty meetings on
whom to hire in a “social neuroscience” search!
We believe that the single major challenge—and exciting open terrain—for the future of
social neuroscience is conceptual rather than methodological. How can we parse social
behavior, to begin with, and what vocabulary of concepts should we deploy in describing
central processes and relating them to neurobiological constituents? This question, we
believe, is also the main source of tension among different strands of social neuroscience or
between those with backgrounds in different disciplines. A large part of this tension stems
from the belief among some social scientists that the processes responsible for
understanding both human and animal social behavior are very complex, are very context-
dependent, and draw on many factors, including ones outside the brain—as such making
these processes ill suited to neuroscientific study.
It is important to understand the several facets behind this tension. One difficulty is simply
to discover the processes, a query that can be approached in different ways—further
development of theoretical frameworks or “discovery science” based on data mining, to
name just two (see Table 1). But another important worry is reductionism, the sense that
neurobiological approaches will generate concepts that displace those of social psychology,
as exemplified in the quote below:
...some of the topics of interest to social psychologists are not amenable to brain
localization techniques because of the complexity of the processes; they have
embedded in them subprocesses that interact, and such complex processes are
difficult to localize. It would be a pity if, in their justifiable enthusiasm for this
powerful tool, social psychologists subtly shifted their research programs to
problems that are amenable to brain localization or shifted their theoretical
language to constructs that are localizable. –Willingham and Dunn (2003)
Certainly, it is currently hard to see how basic computations implemented in small
assemblies of neurons can be related to, say, phenomena such as stereotyping from social
psychology. This threat of reductionism, properly a threat of elimination of concepts
associated with more macroscopic levels of description, is however not unique to social
neuroscience but pervades the study of all of cognition. As in the general case, the way
forward in social neuroscience is simple enough: both micro-and macroscopic levels of
analysis, as well as the development of concepts associated with each of them, should
proceed in tandem. Tension can be relieved if we realize that there is no “fundamental” level
of description, or ontology of concepts, that should have priority over any other; we would
favor a pragmatic view that incorporates new concepts simply on the basis of their utility.
Each level of description has concepts that are the most useful for that level of description.
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Of course, the levels describe a single reality, and so the concepts must somehow relate to
one another. But reduction or elimination is not needed: what is needed is communication,
so that those working at different levels of analysis can appreciate, and understand, work at
different levels. We do not so much need a single language, as we need people who can
speak several languages and translate easily between them.
Nowhere is the challenge of translating across languages more apparent than in comparative
social neuroscience. People with backgrounds in neuroethology, animal behavior, or cellular
neurobiology typically do not discuss science with those doing fMRI in humans. As we
noted at the beginning, the two main societies for social neuroscience in fact reflect this rift:
there are those studying humans (generally with fMRI) on the one hand and those studying
nonhuman animals (generally not with fMRI) on the other. It is interesting to note that the
species differences parallel the different methods used. We most strongly believe that these
differences need communication. Comparisons must be made across species, and the
findings in particular from fMRI studies in humans need to be related to data from other
species and obtained with other methods (see Adolphs and Anderson, 2013). However, it is
one thing to recommend this, and another to spell out in more detail why and how. There are
strengths and weaknesses inherent in the study of different species (see Figure 3), and so it is
natural to ask which should be considered most important: which are the most “social,”
which the easiest to study, and which the most relevant models of human social behavior in
health and in disease? These questions are not easy to answer for the simple reason that we
don’t know much (yet) about the social neuroscience of any species, let alone many of them.
Nonetheless, even a cursory inspection of Figure 3 highlights the fact that different animals
offer very complementary opportunities: insects are tremendously useful for the study of
highly specific social behaviors and their genetic basis; rodents are ideal for optogenetic
manipulation; monkeys offer the best glimpse at the neurophysiology underlying complex
group behaviors most similar to those of humans; and of course humans are indispensable
because they can tell us about ourselves most directly.
We conclude by asking where should we invest our effort, thinking ahead to the next 25
years (see Tables 2 and 3). We highlight three especially exciting avenues for the future.
Arguably, one of the most exciting methods currently in neurobiology is optogenetics. This
approach, especially suitable to the circuit and small-systems level, permits inhibition or
excitation of activity across large populations of cells but with precision at the level of single
cells (Deisseroth, 2011; Zhang et al., 2007). As such, very precise patterns of neural activity
can be manipulated in space and time—so precisely, in fact, that in principle they can
perfectly emulate the patterns that actually occur in the brain normally. It is thus not just the
causal aspect of the method that is so impressive but the (future) ability literally to replay the
neural events that would normally constitute a cognitive event. In the near future, these
techniques will likely reveal with unprecedented detail the causal relationships between
sequences of neural events and social behaviors in many social species including nonhuman
primates (Gerits and Vanduffel, 2013). Indeed, although optogenetic approaches are
currently too invasive for use with humans, it is no longer in the realm of science fiction to
consider that tools of this nature may be available for human research in the not-too-distant
future as well, a prospect that opens up some very exciting possibilities (Alivisatos et al.,
2012). For instance, we could (in principle) reinstantiate the neural state that corresponds to
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social anxiety; it would not be caused so much as constituted. One could imagine tweaking
the neural state slightly, mapping out the boundaries of what people subjectively report as
social anxiety, replaying the neural state as modulated by anxiolytic drugs, and so forth.
There is little question that these advances will play a large role in helping to biologically
constrain theories of social cognition over the next 25 years.
The second exciting future direction is not so much brand-new as greatly expanding:
“discovery science” driven by mining data rather than by formulating hypotheses. Already
the hallmark of genetic data and also of neurobiological data in animals (e.g., the Allen
Brain Atlas for the mouse), the idea of mining fMRI data has been around for over a decade
(Van Horn and Gazzaniga, 2002) but has come into its own only very recently (Yarkoni et
al., 2011). With the launch of several large-scale funding efforts, such as the NIMH-funded
“Human Connectome Project,” the Allen Institute for Brain Science’s “Project Mindscope,”
the European “Blue Brain/ Human Brain” project, and the “BRAINS” project just recently
announced by president Obama, there is no question that the next few years will see a
massive ballooning of data, together with tools to mine it. Although to some extent these
resources can be used simply as one component in the pipeline of an experiment, they also
can be the data to be studied in their own right, revealing new patterns.
This then brings us to our final future direction: computational neuroscience that combines
measures of brain function and behavior with sophisticated mathematical models. There are
several advantages to building concepts based on computational models, including
precision, parametric quantification, and easy expandability. But one feature stands out in
particular: such models may be unique in their applicability across a very wide range of
levels of analysis, from cells to brain systems to behavior. Although model-based fMRI has
been quite widely adopted in studies of learning and decision making, to date, relatively few
have directly applied it to social neuroscience. One early example studied learning behavior
in a strategic game and fit the fMRI data to computational models; the best fitting model
showed not only that participants were tracking opponents’ actions (as a poorer-performing
model showed) but also that the participants understood that their opponents were tracking
them (Hampton et al., 2008). The ability to link distinct computational components of a
model to distinct neural regions offers tremendous promise for understanding more precisely
what it is that these brain regions contribute (Behrens et al., 2009; Dunne and O’Doherty,
2013). Other studies have used computational models to identify neural correlates of
tracking the quality of other peoples’ advice (Behrens et al., 2008; Boorman et al., 2013) or
applied the approach to understanding dysfunction in psychiatric illness (Montague et al.,
2012). The computational approach to social neuroscience questions, although brand-new, is
a growing subfield with substantial activity and promise for the future.
Social neuroscience faces perennial themes of prediction and causality: fMRI, as is well
known, is a purely correlational method. However, the accuracy with which neuroimaging
data are related to cognition and behavior is often tested with the predictive power of the
data—for instance, through training-machine learning algorithms on detailed multivoxel
patterns of activation (Tong and Pratte, 2012). More powerful yet are formal computational
models. Depending on the nature and fit of the model, the data together with the model can
suggest more than correlation and argue for directional causal architectures. Ultimately, this
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is of course the kind of understanding that we want to have, and often it is already implicit in
the way we think about data, even when unjustified. Modern neuroimaging combined with
computational models and vetted with truly causal methods such as optogenetics could thus
be the methods armamentarium for the future of social neuroscience—also making explicit
the need for studies that cut across species. As we noted, we expect that computational
models will help to provide an economical inventory of processes and concepts, and
moreover one that will likely cut across not only species but also levels of analysis. What
exactly that vocabulary will look like is a major open question and brings us back to one
overarching concern: is there anything special about social neuroscience? The investigation
of social behavior defines the field; we should look for an inventory of parameters in our
models that define what is unique about social interactions. As we alluded to above, some
prior studies have done precisely that (Hampton et al., 2008). The challenge as we see it now
is to build up our inventory of processes derived from model-based and data-mining
approaches, pit them against entrenched concepts already in use, and forge forward with a
redefined notion of what social neuroscience is really all about.
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Figure 1. What Is Social Neuroscience?
(A) Metrics of publications over the years. Left: The graph plots the proportion of
publications in social neuroscience relative to those in all of neuroscience, using Web of
Science and methodology described in Matusall et al. (2011) (updated). Right: Past and
current emphases in social neuroscience, obtained by mapping publications in social
neuroscience onto the topics shown (see Matusall et al., 2011 for details).
(B) How important to social neuroscience are four major themes (differently colored rows)?
The figure shows histograms of the distribution of online responses obtained from ca. 85
members of the Society for Social and Affective Neuroscience (SANS) and the Society for
Social Neuroscience (S4SN).
(C) The methods (in rank order) used by social neuroscientists; data from the same
respondents as in (B). Abbreviations are as follows: functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI), electroencephalography (EEG), magnetic resonance imaging (MRI), transcranial
magnetic stimulation (TMS), near infrared spectroscopy (NIRS), positron emission
tomography (PET), and magnetoencephalography (MEG).
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Figure 2. Three Views of the Social Brain
(A) The original view elaborated a set of brain structures originally proposed by Leslie
Brothers (Brothers, 1990).
(B) The current view ties subsets of these structures together into functional networks that
subserve particular components of social cognition; both (A) and (B) are from Kennedy and
Adolphs (2012).
(C) Hints of a future view in which brain networks are derived by mining large data sets
(NeuroSynth; Yarkoni et al., 2011). Left: Lateral (top) and medial (bottom) views of a
reverse-inference map (generated using 293 studies) indicate the likelihood that the term
“social” was used in a study given the presence of activation, i.e., p(term|activation) (brain
activity displayed using NeuroLens; http://www.neurolens.org). We compared this map to
that of 200 independently identified Topic maps (Yarkoni et al., 2011; http://neurosynth.org)
and identified those that were based on more than 30 studies and that either covered more
than 50% of the “social” term map (middle) or were more than 50% covered by the “social”
term map (right). Topic 116 was primarily concerned with emotion; Topic 135 with social
games and interactions; Topic 143 with mentalizing; Topic 20 with fear and arousal; and
Topic 30 with consciousness and awareness. Although these data-mining results should be
considered preliminary, they suggest several intriguing patterns: dorsomedial prefrontal
cortex appears to subserve a general role, appearing ubiquitously across the networks,
whereas regions of the precuneus may be involved more selectively, distinguishing between
emotion and social games. It is also interesting to observe that the amygdala is identified in
all maps with the exception of Topic 143 (mentalizing). Approaches such as the example we
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show here should be used in future studies that make an effort to combine and reconcile
data-mining results with the results of particular experimental studies.
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Figure 3. A Schematic Representation of the Relative Strengths and Weaknesses of Four Animal
Groups Commonly Used to Study Social Neuroscience
Relative rank ordering of the four different groups (human, nonhuman primate, rodent, and
insect) for each of nine themes pertaining to social neuroscience. Darker, thicker bars
indicate a higher rank order. The orderings depicted represent the authors’ sense of the field.
It is the authors’ expressed opinion that no single level of study is superior to any other.
Rather, all are informative and advance the cause of social neuroscience.
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Table 1
Three Approaches to Identifying Core Social Processes
Approach Examples Pros Cons
(A) Social psychology
theories
1 mentalizing processes
(simulation versus
theory of mind)
2 self-relevant versus
other-directed
3 automatic versus
controlled processes
(reflexive versus
reflective)
1 ontology of processes
that map on to social
psychology
2 often intuitive, can
translate to “folk
psychology”
3 rich theoretical
frameworks already
exist
1 may not map well to
neurobiology
2 can become entrenched
and hard to modify
3 Sometimes not strongly
justified by data
(B) Data-driven ontology 1 reverse-correlation
techniques
2 meta-analyses (e.g.,
ALE)
3 NeuroSynth mining
1 relatively unbiased
and objective
2 data-driven; can
derive novel concepts
3 typically based on
very large data sets;
reliable
1 some aspects very new;
still computationally
expensive
2 no agreed-upon
approach; hidden biases
possible
3 interpretation of
discovered processes is
problematic
(C) Computational models 1 neuroeconomics
2 vision
3 motor control
1 can cut across levels
of analysis
2 quantitative and
parametric
3 data drive and
constrain model
selection
1 constraining model
selection nontrivial
2 formalizing social
phenomena is difficult
3 can quickly become
overly complicated
We outline three very different approaches that each have strengths and weaknesses, together with a few well-known examples from each. All three
are currently in use, although (B) and (C) are much more recent than (A). Our own prescription would be to make use of all three and vet them
against one another, something almost never undertaken currently but eminently possible. For instance, (A) and (B) could be used to generate
models under (C); the results from this could be used to refine (A). Or, (B) could be used to check results from (A) and/or (C) against the large
corpus of studies in the literature. We do not believe that we can completely dispense with any of the three, as (A) is essential in giving us
theoretical frameworks rich and intuitive enough to let us understand social cognition; (B) is essential in linking our concepts to cumulative data;
and (C) is essential in embedding the concepts in the brain’s computations and likely best at translating across different levels.
Neuron. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2014 October 30.
N
IH
-PA Author M
anuscript
N
IH
-PA Author M
anuscript
N
IH
-PA Author M
anuscript
Stanley and Adolphs Page 20
Table 2
What Is Known and Not Known in Social Neuroscience
What We Knew all along (but
Sometimes Forgot) What We Have Learned What We Still Need to Know
All animals show social behavior.
Thus, we should study not only humans.
Social processes cannot be localized to
one brain region.
There are distributed systems.
Are social processes different from nonsocial
processes?
If so, why and how?
All behavior depends on the brain.
Thus, neurobiology can inform social
psychology.
fMRI results cannot be interpreted easily.
You need an expert community for
advice.
How far down can we translate social concepts?
What vocabulary can we apply across all levels?
The brain interacts with the body.
Thus, body and immune system also
matter.
A single discipline is inadequate to
understand social behavior.
You need collaboration.
What is unique about human social cognition?
And how is any uniqueness represented at the
neural level?
There are individual differences.
Thus, we have to study individuals as well
as groups.
Our concepts for social processes need
revision.
Not all good old theories will survive.
What are the changes in social cognition across
the lifespan?
How does it emerge in infancy, childhood,
adolescence; how does it change in aging?
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Table 3
The Future of Social Neuroscience
What Do Social Neuroscientists Say?
Current Research Interests Social Neuroscience Is Currently Lacking Future of Social Neuroscience
Emotion Statistical/Methodological Rigor Applied Science
Clinical Disorders Ecological Validity Computational Approaches
Self-Regulation Interdisciplinary Integration Networks in the Brain
Development Computational Approaches Real-World Behaviors
Decision-Making Theory Social Interaction
What are the open questions? The table summarizes an inventory of what is currently being studied, what is thought to be missing, and what the
future may hold, obtained from the same respondents as in Figure 1B. Respondents were asked to provide 3–5 keywords that best described the
following: (1) [their] current research interests; (2) areas in which social neuroscience is lacking; and (3) the future of social neuroscience. The
resulting sets of keywords were sorted into umbrella categories, and the top five categories for each question were identified. The results are
displayed for each question in rank order. The gray level of the background indicates the rank (i.e., categories with the same color had identical
rank).
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